Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

1939

Recent Case Trends in Local Taxation
Robert C. Brown
Indiana University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Taxation-State and Local Commons

Recommended Citation
Brown, Robert C., "Recent Case Trends in Local Taxation" (1939). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 1790.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1790

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by
Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

RECENT CASE TRENDS
LOCAL TAXATION
(a) Relation of municipal corporations to the
state with reference to the taxing power
The complete dependence of the taxing power of
a municipality (as indeed of all other powers) upon
the state was emphasized by the Supreme Court of
Florida in Durham v. Pentucket Groves, Inc., 189
So. 482 (1939). Here a statute provided that when
any municipality of 150 electors or less had within
it lands which were excluded from the benefits of
the municipality, such lands might on the petition
of the owner be excluded from the municipality
and thereby be released from all its obligations.
In this case certain lands were thus excluded; but
this exclusion was protested by holders of municipal bonds payable from land taxes. The court,
however, sustained the exclusion of the lands from
the municipality, and their consequent exemption
from municipal taxes, on the ground that the bondholders must have taken the bonds with knowledge
of the possibility of their exclusion of the land
from the taxable property of the municipality under
the terms of the state statute. The statute was
held not to contravene the provision of the state
constitution providing that the legislature might
abolish municipalities, but only on condition that
their creditors should be protected.
In spite of this complete power of the state, the
courts try to protect the municipalities so far as
possible. Thus it was held by the Supreme Court
of Minnesota in Board of Education v. Anderson,
285 N. W. 80 (1939), that an amendment to the
state income tax law providing for the change of
the distribution of the state income tax among
the school districts of the state was not retroactive
in operation and did not affect income tax already
collected when it came into effect. Though of
course the legislature might have made this change
retroactive, the court held that it had not. It was
also held in Little Red River Levee District v.
Moore, 126 S. W. (2d) 605 (Ark., 1939) that land
held by an improvement district for its public purposes is not subject to state taxes, in the absence
of an express statute thus subjecting it. Here the
district had sold timber on land which it had
bought in for non-payment of taxes, under an
agreement that the purchaser should pay the state
taxes due from the district in consideration of an

extension of time for payment of the timber. The
court held that since the district had no obligation
to pay the state taxes the extension was unenforceable as without consideration; but this did not
effect the binding force of the original sale.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee held in Storie
v. Norman, 130 S. W. (2d) 101 (1939), that a
county had no power to levy additional taxes beyond the limited general authorization except where
the state statutes clearly give such additional authorization. Under this general principle it was
held that no taxes could be imposed for the costs
of courts, for officers' salaries, or for taking care
of paupers. In all these cases, there were statutory
provisions fixing the amount due; but the court
considered that the legislature contemplated that
this should be covered under the general tax levy.
On the other hand, imposition of special taxes for
jail purposes and for a sinking fund for "time
warrants" were upheld. In both these cases the
court held that the special authorization for these
purposes clearly indicated that a special tax could
be levied to pay for them. In the case of the time
warrants the special tax could cover both interest
and principal. The court held that the county was
authorized only to issue bonds but considered that
the time warrants were really bonds under a different name.
Finally, in Spokane v. State, 89 Pac. (2d) 826
(1939), the Supreme Court of Washington held
without discussion that a city is subject to a state
excise tax upon the use of personal property
brought into the state. The only question discussed
was as to the interpretation of the use tax law.
(b) Property taxes-exemptions and abatements
The Supreme Court of Georgia in Elder v. Home
B. & L. Association, 3 S. E. (2d) 75 (1939),
asserted the well settled proposition that where a
state constitution designates premissable exemptions from property taxation, other statutory exemptions are unconstitutional. Here the legislature
attempted to exempt from taxation debts owed by
the stockholders of a building and loan association
to the association. This the court held was not
permitted by the state constitution. The court
apparently conceded that such an exemption might
be sustained even under the strict terms of the
state constitution, provided it merely did away
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with double taxation; but it asserted that this
exemption could not thus be justified, especially
as it was not shown that all the exempted debts
were secured by mortgage on taxable real estate.
The exemption of state property from municipal
taxes was emphatically supported by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Dauphin County, 6 Atl. (2d) 870 (1939). Here the
state had invested part of its employees retirement
system fund in a mortgage. The mortgage was foreclosed and the property bought in by the state.
It was held that this property could not be subjected to local taxation. The court said that while
there is a general presumption against tax exemptions, this presumption does not apply in the case
of property owned by the state, which can only
be subjected to local taxation by express and
affirmative statutory language. The court also
found that there was an express exemption for this
property in the statute creating the employees retirement fund.
The Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Gulfport, 189 So. 703 (1939), held, without discussion,
that homesteads were entirely exempt from property tax under a provision of the state constitution,
even though the constitutional provision had been
adopted after the original obligations payable from
the tax money had been issued. These obligations
were now being refunded, but it was held that the
homestead property was entirely exempt.
The case of Y.W.C.A. v. Baumann, 130 S. W.
(2d) 439 (1939), shows a somewhat more liberal
point of view of the Supreme Court of Missouri
as to tax exemptions than has sometimes been the
case with that court. Here the property of the
Y.W.C.A. in St. Louis was held exempt, notwithstanding the fact that the association taught swimming and tennis in the building, for which instruction a fee was exacted, and also that a cafeteria
open to the public was operated in the building.
The court said that the fees for the swimming and
tennis classes were no more than frequently charged
by educational institutions clearly exempt; and
that the cafeteria was hardly a real commercial
enterprise, and, in any event, was merely incidental
to the principle use of the building. The entire
property was therefore held exempt from taxation.
Even more liberal to taxpayers is the point of
view of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in
Memphis v. Alpha Beta Welfare Association, 126
S. W. (2d) 323 (1939). Here the question was
as to the taxability of the property of a fraternity

composed entirely of medical students of a university. The court held the property exempt,
though conceding that college fraternity property
is not normally exempt from tax, at least in the
absence of an express statute. The exemption was
predicated upon the theory that this fraternity was
actually an educational institution. It was shown
that the upper-class members gave counsel and
advice to the younger students and that there were
numerous informal lectures by city doctors. It was
further alleged that the association of the members
of this chapter with medical students of other
chapters enabled the students to learn the "art"
besides the science of medicine. It is difficult to
see how this property was actually used any differently from any other fraternity property, and
the exemption seems hardly justified.
On the other hand the decision of the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island in Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities v. Tax Assessors
of Newport, 5 Atl. (2d) 293 (1939), 5 L. N. 60
(July, 1939), seems to go rather far the other way.
Here property of an association organized in Massachusetts for the preservation of old houses in New
England was held subject to local taxation on its
property in Newport, Rhode Island. The decision
was based on the ground that the association was
not shown to be educational or charitable. The
court seemed to emphasize particularly a provision
of the charter limiting the admission to such houses
which could be charged to the public. It was contended that this did not expressly say that the public was to be admitted at all-an argument which
reminds one a little bit of the famous (or infamous)
legal decision by Portia. It is submitted that this
decision is unduly illiberal, and that the exemption
should have been accorded.
In Bridgeport v. First National Bank, 7 Atl.
(2d) 829 (1939), the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut decided that a proceeding for the
abatement of taxes under a statute permitting such
an abatement where the taxpayer was poor was
not put to an end by the death of the person
assessed. This decision seems rather obviously
correct.
(c)

Property taxes--assessment and levy

Exporters Etc. Co. v. Marlin, 130 S. W. (2d)
860 (1939), a decision by the Texas Court of
Appeals, lays down the well-settled principle that
the assessing authorities are accorded wide latitude
in their methods of determining valuation. Here
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the Board of Equalization took into consideration
many facts and circumstances in valuating the
property in question. The court declined to change
the valuation even though a jury had found it too
high.
Similarly, Commonwealth v. Louisville Gas and
Electric Co., 128 S.W. (2d) 778 (1939), a decision by the Appellate Court of Kentucky, sustains
the determination by the State Tax Commission of
the franchise value of a utility even though the
valuation was made solely on the basis of net income, and although there was considerable dispute
as to certain items of deduction in computing such
net income. The securities of the utility were apparently not dealt in on the market, and the court
therefore held that the basis of net income was
the best or at least was a permissible basis for
valuation. It was conceded that the assessment
could have been set aside for fraud, but no fraud
appeared merely because of considerable differences
of opinion between the assessing board and the
state.
The similarly wide discretion given to the administrative authorities in assessing taxes is shown
in Payne County Excise Board v. Atchison Etc.
Ry. Co., 90 Pac. (2d) 422 (1939), where the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that a provision
of the state laws that unclaimed tax refunds should
be added to the surplus for the fund for which the
taxes were collected did not necessarily require a
corresponding reduction in the tax levy for that
fund in the subsequent year.
It is well settled that due process of law requires
reasonable notice to taxpayers of the assessment of
their property. However, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals in Board of Supervisors v. Smith, 128
S. W. (2d) 540 (1939), held that personal notice
of an increase of assessment is unnecessary. Here
the notice was taken to the house of the taxpayer,
and on failure of any one to answer the door-bell,
was posted on the door. This was held adequate
notice. It may be noted, however, that this particular taxpayer 'could hardly claim inadequacy of
notice since he was compelled to admit that he
actually saw the notice the same day. A similar
rule was applied as to the service of notice of delinquency by the Louisiana Court of Appeals in
Reed v. Stinson, 188 So. 509 (1939).
(d) Property taxes-collection
That there is no vested right in the rules covering the collection of taxes, which are subject to

October, 1939

change at any time, is entirely clear; but the courts
tend to construe statutes making such procedural
changes rather strictly. This is shown by the decision of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in
HarrisburgTrust Co. v. Romberger, 5 Atl. (2d) 597
(1939). Here the legislature changed the law
covering the method of collecting taxes. It was
held that this change did 'not repeal a previous
statute governing tax sales, and providing that
where the property brought sufficient to cover the
delinquent taxes, the lien of such taxes was removed even though they were not actually paid.
The rather absurd lengths to which some courts
go in construing tax statutes as not imposing personal liability is evidenced in the recent decision
of Commonwealth ex rel. Martin v. Stone, 130
S. W. (2d) 750 (Ky., 1939). Here it was attempted to impose a personal liability for taxes
upon the owner of property; but the court denied
such personal liability even though the statute apparently provided expressly for it. The court said
that this provision of the statute was intended to
apportion the liability between the holders of different interests in the property, but not to impose
a personal liability upon any one of them. It must
be conceded that this rather forced construction of
the statute is perhaps partly justified by a later
statute (not applicable in this case) which had
clearly imposed personal liability.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held in
In re Curtis, 6 At. (2d) 283 (1939), that a city
has no power by ordinance to impose a penalty
for non-payment of taxes collected by the city as
agent for the state. The court conceded that the
grant of power to a municipality to impose taxes
carries with it a power to impose penalties for
non-payment; but since these were state taxes,
merely collected by the city as a matter of convenience, the state law as to penalties governed,
and the city had no power to add to it. Somewhat
similarly, the Supreme Court of Arizona held in
Maricopa Co. District v. Oglesby, 91 Pac. (2d)
257 (1939), that a provision of a state law giving
to a county all interest and penalties on taxes of a
conservation district within the county, but collected by the county, was valid. The court contended that this award of interests and penalties
to the county was intended as compensation due
it for its work in collecting the taxes.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Munkwitz
Co. v. Deidrich Schaefer Co., 286 N. W. 30 (1939),
held that penalties and interest on delinquent taxes,
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as well as the taxes themselves, are a preferred
claim in the case of bankruptcy of the owner of
the property. The court conceded that there were
many authorities to the contrary on this point.
The preference did not however extend to a 5%
penalty to be paid to a police officer for collecting
the taxes. The court held that in fact this penalty
could not be claimed at all, since the taxes were
not collected.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held in
Conaty v. Guaranty Loan Co., 6 Atl. (2d) 698
(1939), that there is no preference even for taxes
themselves in a receivership proceeding, unless
claim therefore is duly made in the proceedings by
the municipality to which the taxes are owed.
Accordingly, a legal or equitable assignee of the
rights of the municipality could not claim preference unless the municipality itself had made the
claim. The court further held that a mortgagee
which had paid the taxes on the property, was not
entitled to subrogation to the municipal tax lien
-an
illiberal but unfortunately not uncommon
judicial point of view. The mortgagee had previously brought an action at law to recover the
amount paid, and the court contended this evidenced an election not to claim subrogation.
The case of Myrick v. O'Neill, 92 Pac. 651
(1939), a decision of the California Court of Appeals, is a holding that a revocation of the franchise of a corporation for failure to pay its franchise
tax does not invalidate a subsequent mortgage of
its property made by the corporation. The court
relied upon a change in the statutes of the state
which made contracts of corporations thus suspended from activity merely voidable and not void,
as provided in the previous statute. In any event,
it would seem this result should be reached, even
under the old statute, in the interest of security
of title of real estate.
The courts necessarily construe statutes imposing tax and similar liens rather strictly. This principle may have been carried rather too far by the
Supreme Court of Alabama in King v. American
Surety Co., 187 So. 458 (1939). Here the statute
provided that in the case a petition was made to a
court for the establishment of a drainage district
and the court found the petition was insufficient,
a lien for court costs should be placed upon the
property of the petitioner. In this case, the petition
was found sufficient but was voluntarily withdrawn
by the petitioner. It was held that no lien should
be imposed upon the property since the statute

provided for such only when the petition was found
insufficient.
In Edge v. Lexington, 127 S. W. (2d) 393
(1939), the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held
that a taxpayer who resists an action by a city to
enforce tax liens, on the ground that the liens are
invalid, cannot claim the right to redeem given by
the same statute which provided for the tax liens.
The position of the court was that if a taxpayer
insists that the statute is invalid he cannot claim
any affirmative rights given by the same statute.
The rules as to tax sales continue to be rather
strict, at least so far as involves compliance with
statutes. This is shown by the decision of the
New York Court of Appeals in Olds v. Jamestown, 20 N. E. (2d) 756 (1939). Here the state
statute provided that notice of municipal tax sales
should be published once a week for six successive
weeks. The city council of Jamestown attempted
to amend the charter by changing the requirement
of publication to only three weeks. The court seems
disposed to sustain the validity of this change,
though expressly reserving the point. However, it
held that where the last publication came only
sixteen days after the first publication, the notice
was insufficient, as the three publications were required to be a week apart. The tax sale in question was held therefore wholly void.
In Baker v. Duson, 189 So. 510 (1939), a decision of the Court of Appeals of Louisiana, a municipal tax sale was sustained even though the purchaser never entered into possession of the property, and even though neither the original owner
nor the purchaser at the tax sale paid subsequent
state and parish taxes. The property was adjudicated to the state for the delinquent state and
parish taxes, but was redeemed by the original
owner. It was held nevertheless that the original
sale for delinquent taxes was valid and binding.
The redemption from the sale for delinquent state
and parish taxes was expressly made without prejudice to any privilege of the municipal corporation;
but the court indicated that the same result would
have been reached anyway.
In District Landowners Trust v. Adams Co., 89
Pac. (2d) 251 (1939), the Supreme Court of
Colorado sustained a statute authorizing any irrigation district to sell tax sale certificates in its
possession at such times and under such terms as
the governing board of the district should determine. A sale by the particular district of a number
of tax certificates in bulk was sustained, even
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though the taxes were delinquent before the statute
was passed, and even though a prospective purchaser, who was interested in part of the property
and therefore desired to bid, was not notified of
the sale. The decision is an encouraging example
of a tendency (which should be strengthened) to
permit the simplication and the increase of effectiveness of tax sales.
On the other hand Culmer v. Office Realty Co.,
189 So. 52 (1939), a decision of the Supreme Court
of Florida, seems somewhat reactionary. The
question was as to the 'Validity of extending the
statutory time for redemption from tax sales. The
court quite reasonably held that this could not be
done where the tax sale certificates were in the
hands of private purchasers at the time of the
extension. But it further held that the same rule
applies even though the certificates were in the
hands of the state. To thus extend the time for
redemption would, the court held, interfere with
the settled system of collection of taxes in the
state, and therefore violate the provision of the
constitution requiring property taxes to be uniform
and to be annually levied and collected. The Florida Court has several times before taken a very
narrow attitude as to the legality of the compromise
of taxes; and the present decision seems an extension of the same unfortunate point of view.
(e)

Property taxes-rights of taxpayers

In Davenport v. Snyder, 90 Pac. (2d) 652
(1939), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma dealt
with an attempt of a single taxpayer to enjoin a
tax sale not only of his own land but as to all
lands on which this tax was delinquent. The contention of the plaintiff was that while the tax was
valid the method of collection used by the county
was invalid. The decision of the court was that
such a suit could not be maintained; that no taxpayer could enforce the rights of any other taxpayer to prevent the enforcement of a tax. Nor
did the plaintiff show that his interests as a general
taxpayer would be substantially affected even if
the sale was a useless expense to the municipality.
That a taxpayer cannot ordinarily prevent the
collection of delinquent taxes by mandamus is
shown by the decision of the Supreme Court of
Ohio in State v. Pontius, 21 N. E. (2d) 868 (1939).
The taxpayer claimed that part of the tax which
it was not tendering and the acceptance of which
tender was attempted to be enforced by mandamus,
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was illegal. The court said that this was essentially an attempt to enjoin the collection of this
tax, which could not be allowed, where there apparently would be an adequate remedy at law.
A similar point of view was taken by the Court
of Chancery of New Jersey in Luckenbach Terminals, Inc. v. North Bergen, 6 Atl. (2d) 548
(1939). Here the taxpayer attempted to secure
an injunction against the enforcement of a tax, on
the alleged grounds that the apportionment and
assessments were fraudulent and void. The court
declined to permit the action to be maintained,
holding that a more specific case must be shown
for equitable relief, especially as the plaintiff appeared to have been guilty of considerable laches.
The court pointed out that the normal method of
review of an assessment by a court was by a writ
of certiorari.
In Huber v. Delong, 91 Pac. (2d) 53 (1939),
the Supreme Court of Wyoming had to deal with
an injunction suit which though relating to taxes
is clearly maintainable under proper circumstances.
Here the suit was not an attempt to enjoin the
collection of taxes but was directed against a purchaser at a tax sale. The suit was brought by the
former owner of the property and alleged that the
sale was void. The invalidity of the sale seems to
have been conceded. The court held, however, that
the plaintiff must do equity by repaying the amount
paid at the tax sale by the defendant; and in the
absence of an offer on the plaintiff's part to do
this, the suit was dismissed.
In certain cases an aggrieved taxpayer will be
debarred from any relief because of his own delinquency. An example of this is Bridgeport Screw
Co. v. Bridgeport, 7 Atl. (2d) 649 (1939), a decision of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
Here the assessment for the years 1927 to 1934
was made on the basis of tax maps, which erroneously included as part of the plaintiff's property
some adjoining property. The plaintiff paid the
taxes assessed for these years without discovering
the mistake and now sues to recover the additional
taxes thus paid. The court held that the plaintiff
was barred by its own negligence. Somewhat similar is the decision of the Supreme Court of Colorado in Stephens & Co. v. Board of Equalization,
92 Pac. (2d) 732 (1939). Here the mistake was
in the valuation; but it was due to a clerical error
of the plaintiff's bookkeeper in making the return
of its property. Here too the court denied recovery
of additional taxes paid, on the ground that it was
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the fault of the plaintiff itself rather than of the
taxing authorities.
(f)

Other municipal taxes
The principles which have already been stated
apply in many respects in municipal taxes other
than property. However, there have been an increasing number of cases involving particular features of these other sorts of taxes.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held
in Campbell v. Goode, 2 S. E. (2d) 456 (1939),
that a provision of the state constitution prohibiting the collection of poll taxes by legal process
until they have been delinquent for three years
invalidates a statute making the payment of poll
taxes a prerequisite to a license to practice law.
The court said that this was certainly collection by
legal process, as the practice of law by an unlicensed person is a serious crime.
The District Court of Appeals of California held
in McAdams Oil Co. v. Los Angeles, 89 Pac. (2d)
729 (1939), that a city ordinance exacting a license
tax of Y cent per barrel of oil produced within the
city limits was valid. The court conceded that
this was a tax and could not be sustained as an inspection fee. Nevertheless, it was a valid tax, and
not subject to attack because it ignored the specific
gravity, and therefore the value, of the oil produced, the court holding that a distinction of this
basis is not practical or required.
Less liberal, and it is submitted less sensible, is
the decision by the Supreme Court of Alabama in
Rochell v. Florence, 188 So. 249 (1939), invalidating a city tax on the distribution of soft drinks
from a warehouse not located in the city. The
court said that this was a tax upon a method of
doing business, which is unconstitutional-an indication that this court has never heard of the
chain store tax cases! But the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia in Elder v. Smith, 2 S. E.
(2d) 670 (1939), invalidating a business license
tax based on gross income of the previous year, on
the ground that it is unfair to determine this year's
tax on the basis of last year's business, seems almost as bad. Perhaps this latter case might be
sustained on the theory that the tax was at ,an
increasing rate, which seems in disfavor as to gross
sales taxes; but the grounds given would invalidate
practically every gross and also every net income
tax.
In Decatur v. Poole, 189 So. 483 (1939), the
Supreme Court of Alabama had before it the

question whether a city sales tax could be avoided
by purporting to deliver the goods sold to the
buyer outside the city. The scheme was that the
goods should be delivered in the city but the buyer
should take them outside of the city (being paid
for transporting them) and deliver them to himself
there. It is hardly necessary to add that the court
made short shrift of this plainly fraudulent scheme,
and held that the sales were made in the city and
taxable by it.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recently
decided two cases involving the nature of a net
income tax. The first of these, Sley System v.
Philadelphia,5 At. (2d) 583 (1939), involved the
state net income tax in its effect on a municipal
tax on the gross receipts from parking lots. A
state statute prohibited cities from taxing property
or transactions taxed by the state. The court held
that this provision invalidated the city tax, since
the owner of the business had to pay a net income
tax to the state. This net income tax must be regarded as a tax upon the property and business,
which is therefore immune from tax by the city.
Taking the decision literally, it is hard to see much
left for the city to tax.
In Butcher v. Philadelphia, 6 Atl. (2d) 298
(1939), the same court held without discussion
that a city net income tax is valid but is to be regarded as a property tax. It is therefore subject
to the uniformity clause, and no exemptions can
be permitted. Neither can a provision giving a
credit for ordinary property taxes paid by the same
taxpayer be allowed. The law was sustained but
with provisions of this sort eliminated. It is submitted the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is unduly limiting municipal and even state taxing
power by its unfortunate misunderstanding of the
nature of a net income tax, which should be regarded as a property tax.
ROBERT C. BROWN

DELEGATION AND CONSTRUCTION

OF

MUNICIPAL POWERS
A. Nature and Construction
Reaching fairly consistent results as to actual
disposition of the problems considered, several recent cases present interesting variations in the
language used to describe the nature and construction of municipal powers. All cases found within
the last few months recognize the well-settled prin-
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ciple as announced in Judge Dillon's classic statement:
"A municipality is a creature of the legislature and it can exercise (1) the powers granted
in express terms; (2) those necessarily or
fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers
expressly granted; and (3) those essential to
the accomplishment of the declared objects of
the corporation-not simply convenient, but
only those which are indispensable, to the
accomplishment of the declared objects of the
corporation."
As the Honorable Murray Seasongood frequently
points out, however, this statement itself contains
an ambiguity as to the implied powers. There is
an essential inconsistency between the restriction
of implied powers to those necessarily implied, while
at the same time permitting inclusion of those fairly
implied. This classic statement may itself be the
cause of some of the variation in the approach of
courts to the interpretation of municipal powers
or it may be merely a classic example of the confusion resulting from the complicated and numerous
sources from which municipal powers are derived
and applied to an ever-changing and widening
scope of facts surrounding municipal activities. As
a result it may be said at the risk of a perversion
of language that, while all cases adhere to the strict
rule of interpretation that doubtful powers are to
be resolved against the municipality, some courts
apply the strict rule with great liberality. There is
a natural tendency to assume that home rule cities
have broad general powers coextensive with those
of the legislature itself. While this is probably the
practical result of the wide sphere of activity reposed in a municipality with respect to local affairs
under home rule, nevertheless, it has been appropriately pointed out that, except for the differences
in the source of power and the necessarily resulting
differences from the broad scope of powers conferred, the construction of powers in a home rule
city should follow the same principles as those of
non home rule cities. See Bird, J., dissenting in
Bowler v. Nagel, 228 Mich. 434, 200 N. W. 259
at 262 (1924), and City of Kalamazoo v. Titus,
208 Mich. 252, 175 N. W. 480 (1919).
Unusually broad isthe language used by the
Supreme Court of Michigan in construing the
powers of the City of Detroit in the case of Detroit
v. Safety nv. Corp., 288 Mich. 511, 285 N. W. 42
(1939). The actual decision of this case is ortho-
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dox. The question presented was whether the city
had authority to adopt a charter amendment providing for a specific method of foreclosure for tax
liens. The court held that the power to levy taxes
for the existence and financial support of the community must be construed as implying power to
provide for prompt methods of enforcement. In
discussing the interpretation of the powers of the
City of Detroit under the Home Rule Act, however, the court quotes with approval language
originally appearing in the case of Thomas v. Board
of Supervisors, 214 Mich. 72 at 85, 182 N. W. 417
at 421 (1921).
"When action is taken by a state or one of
its municipal subdivisions, manifestly in the
interests of its people as a whole, and the
rights of individuals are not abridged thereby,
and such action is not within the inhibition of
some constitutional or statutory provision, it
should be upheld as a valid exercise of authority, though lacking in any positive grant
of power to support it."
This language is significant as indicating an approach quite different from that of the classic statement above. It seems to substitute for the carefully
enumerated steps of strict construction a broad
approach safeguarded by the limitations of the
manifest interest of the people as a whole, the
rights of private individuals and specific constitutional or statutory limitations.
In the case of Kennerly v. Town of Dallas, 215
N. C. 532, 2 S. E. (2d) 538 (1939), 5 LEGAL
NOTES 49 (July, 1939), the court quotes with
approval the traditional language of Judge Dillon
but was presented with the very simple problem of
determining the obvious meaning of an express
legislative grant of power. The action was brought
against the municipality for death alleged to be
the result of negligence of municipal employees in
the operation of an extra-territorial electric light
system. Among other defenses the city contended
that its operation of an electric light plant for
distribution of electric service outside the corporate
limits was ultra vires the corporation and therefore
no liability of the municipality could result from
the ultra vires act. Specific legislation, however,
was cited by the court together with amendments
thereto which conferred on the municipality the
power to furnish light to any person, firm, or corporation outside the corporate limits and to fix the
rates therefor.
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A New York court in considering the validity of
a local law purporting to authorize store keepers
and peddlers in New York City to display Christmas trees, holiday decorations and toys on sidewalks during December, found the act to be outside the power of the municipality. The court first
read the measure in the light of the existing charter
and found that it conflicted with a provision requiring that revocable licenses be required for any
permitted use or obstruction of the streets or sidewalks for erection of booths, stands, displays, etc.
The court then considered the possibility of interpretation of the measure as a charter amendment
and found it invalid on this count because the
procedure for enactment of a charter amendment
had not been complied with. People v. Berner, 10
N. Y. S. (2d) 339 (N. Y. Co., 1939). The court
said:
"Governmental agencies, be they legislative,
executive or judicial, may not trespass beyond
their defined or fairly implied authority, nor
infringe upon the limitations specifically expressed in the basic organism creating them
and under whose authority they are enabled
to exist and to function."
An undoubted application of a very strict and
perhaps short sighted interpretation of municipal
power is found in a Rhode Island case entitled
In re Opinion to the House of Representatives, 5
At. (2d) 455 (R. I., 1939). The Supreme Court
had been asked its opinion as to the power of the
Providence Bureau of Police and Fire to adopt
parking meters as a means of traffic control. The
court held that there was no express charter or
statutory provision authorizing a charge for parking on the city streets. They indicated that it was
significant that at no time in the past had any such
charge been made and concluded that the power
to impose a parking fee did not exist. It should
be noted that in this case the court failed to consider or did not treat as of any importance the
distinction recognized in most of the parking meter
cases in other jurisdictions between a tax for revenue purposes and a license fee imposed to defray
the reasonable cost of police regulation. Most of
the cases find power to impose a fee designed to
return to the city the reasonable cost of police
regulation as an incident of the police power.
Correspondingly rigid is the interpretation of the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma of the power of the
City of Broken Bow to levy a license tax on an
oil company pursuant to the grant of power to

levy a license tax on occupations and on "merchants
of all kinds". In this case the court held that the
word merchant necessarily meant one who not only
sold at retail but who also purchased commodities
for resale. The oil company in question was a
manufacturer-producer and did not purchase commodities for resale but sold its own products principally at wholesale, and to a small extent, retail.
It is noteworthy that the statement of the method
of interpreting powers set forth in this case omits
any reference to powers "fairly" implied. It concludes that any doubt as to the existence of a power
is to be resolved against the municipality. Magnolia Pet. Co. v. City of Broken Bow, 184 Okl. 362,
87 Pac. (2d) 319 (1939). A comparison might be
suggested between this court's interpretation of
the meaning given by the municipality to the word
"merchant" and the court's interpretation in a case
discussed below of the meaning of the word "newspaper of general circulation" as adopted by a
municipality. See King County v. The Superior
Court in and for King County, infra.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Gregory
v. City of Raceland, 130 S. W. (2d) 825 (Ky.
1939) found that a sewage disposal plant is not
part of a sewage system and therefore the municipality was not empowered to construct such a
disposal plant and assess the cost thereof against
property abutting on the sewer line. While the
court announces the view of strict interpretation
in the strictest terms the decision reached would
be impelled by any approach adopted in view of
the interpretation of legislative intent by simple
statutory construction. Statutes of the state specifically provide that cities of the third and fourth
classes may construct sewer systems and include
in them sewage disposal plants. The court decides
that the omission of reference to sewage disposal
plants in the corresponding powers prescribed for
cities of the fifth class must be taken as intentional.
B.

Discretion

The Supreme Court of Washington in the case
of King County v. Superior Court, 92 Pac. (2d) 694
(Wash. 1939) held that the power of the county
commissioners to contract with a newspaper for
insertion of legal notices was a discretionary power
invested in the board of commissioners as an administrative body. The exercise of such power is
held, therefore, to be beyond the scope of judicial
review so long as it does not transcend the limits
placed on such power by the charter and the state
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D. Contracts
Perhaps the most carefully considered case of
those decided in the past few months on the subject of municipal power to contract is Federal
Paving Corp. v. City of Wauwatosa, 286 N. W. 546
(Wis., 1939). The court. in its opinion not only
takes occasion to analyze the whole matter of
municipal liability for unjust enrichment in cases
involving void contracts, but also cites law review
articles, treatises, and section 62 of the Restatement on Restitution. In spite of its exhaustive
analysis of the subject the court holds that, however harsh the result may appear to be, the weight
of authority upholds the proposition that failure
to. comply with mandatory procedure in contracting
with a municipality leaves the contracting party
without remedy on principles of quasi-contract or
restitution as well as on the contract. In this situation a paving contract with the city was invalid
because of the failure of the city to comply with
the statute requiring publication of advertisements
such
as
designated
"An official newspaper,
for bids as the basis for letting the contract. The
by a municipal corporation, whether city,
court sets out and follows as a principle the propwho
county, or state, is available to anyone
noofficial
the
with
osition that a "municipality does not become liable
touch
in
keep
to
desires
for money, goods or services upon principles of untices therein published, and anyone desiring
to read the official bulletins may subscribe to
just enrichment where it is prohibited from conthe newspaper or read it at some library."
tracting in any other than a specified way as, for
See in accord Hall v. Milwaukee, 115 Wis. 479, instance, with the lowest bidder."
As evidence of the growing trend toward a more
91 N. W. 998 (1902), Linn v. Allen, 145 Ind. 584,
liability of municipalities for restitution and
liberal
29
Coldron,
44 N. E. 646 (1896), and Hesler v.
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for
215
only
of
paper
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Okla. 216, 116 Pac. 787
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least
at
tract
v.
Rose,
rel.
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ex
State
circulation). Contra:
the
specific subject matter but the confor
contract
93 Fla. 1018, 114 So. 373 (1927), Crowell v.
is
invalid because of failure to comexecuted
tract
Parker, 22 R. I.51, 46 Atl. 35 (1900).
ply with statutory provisions in the manner of
C. Delegation
contracting see American La-France, Inc. v. City
of Philadelphia,184 So. 620 (Miss. 1938); 4 LFGAL
a
township
that
Affirming the general proposition
committee cannot delegate its powers to an indi- NOTEs 305 (March, 1939), noted (1939) 16 N. Y.
vidual and that such a committee must act by way U. L. Q. Rev. 494. Where the subject of the conof ordinance or resolution, the common pleas court tract is legal and the invalidity of the specific
of Monmouth County, New Jersey, held that a contract results from failure to comply with direcpolice officer was improperly discharged for viola- tory rather than mandatory procedure, cases usution of regulations which had been promulgated ally permit recovery against the municipality for
orally by the chief of police. Harvey v. Poole, benefits conferred. In general, the courts will not
7 At. (2d) 630 (N. J. 1939). In this case the permit recovery in quasi where the invalidity of
township committee had power to adopt rules and the express contract results from failure to comply
regulations for the management of the police de- with a mandatory procedural provision. The
very unusual in
partment but it delegated its authority to do so to American La-France, Inc. case is
that since the
held
court
the
fact
that
the
the chief of police who promulgated oral regula- view of
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failure
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the
provision
a
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with
committee.
laws and so long as the power is not shown to be
exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
This case is particularly interesting for its discussion of the nature of a newspaper as distinguished
from a "propaganda" or "house organ". It is to be
noted that in the trial of the case below a large
number of newspaper men testified unanimously
that the newspaper with which the commissioners
had contracted for insertion of legal notices was not
a newspaper in the proper sense of the word but was
a propaganda sheet of limited circulation or a
"member house organ". The contention was made
that the authority of the Commissioners extended
to contracting for insertion of legal notices in a
newspaper of general circulation only and that
notices published in the paper chosen would be
invalid. The decision reviews a large number of
cases and decides that for the purpose of legal
notices the dictionary or journalistic definition of
a newspaper need not be followed. The court says:
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denied recovery for the reasonable value of equipment furnished. In order to relieve the hardship
of the situation, however, the court referred to the
power of the municipality to lease rather than
purchase the equipment that had been contracted
for under a purchase and sale agreement and held
the city liable as a lessee for reasonable compensation for use of the equipment.
The great volume of municipal activity and the
expansion of municipal enterprises is indeed persuasive justification for expanding the rule of liability of a municipal corporation for restitution or
unjust enrichment while at the same time recognizing, of course, the public policy requiring limitation of municipal activities by strict construction
in order to protect the taxpayer.
Following the general rule is the case of Hamer
v. City of Huntington, 21 N. E. (2d) 407 (Ind.
1939). In this case the mandatory provision that
funds be appropriated for purchase of equipment
before the contract of purchase may be legally executed was not complied with and the court held
that a taxpayer could enjoin payment for equipment delivered to the city under the contract which
was void. The court also held that although the
city had power to purchase the fire engine and
equipment involved, the contract was void and
could not be subsequently ratified.
Two cases hold that no claim for compensation
may be made on a basis of implied contract or
quantum meruit where an express contract governs
the relations of the parties and the services rendered were governed by its terms. Ralph B. Slippy
Engineering Corporation v. City of Grinnell, 286
N. W. 508 (Iowa 1939); Bronx Asphalt Corporation v. City of New York, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 197
(City Ct. of N. Y., Bx. Co., 1939). The New York
case, however, also expresses the proposition that
where the city has received the benefit of services
rendered by the plaintiff under the terms of the
contract, it may not enrich itself through misrepresentations, authorized or unauthorized. The city
was bound by representations made to the contractor by the chief of the bureau of audit and the
disbursing clerk in the comptroller's office concerning the effect of a reservation contained in the
release executed at the time of the receipt of a
warrant for less than the amount claimed.
Extra compensation claimed on the basis of an
implied contract was also denied in the case of
Willis Bancroft, Inc. v. Millcreek Tp., 6 Atl. (2d)
916 (Pa. 1939). The contractor had a properly

executed contract with the township but performed
the work according to extensive and material
changes ordered by the engineer which increased
the cost of the work and extended the time necessary for completion. The theory of his claim, which
was first presented to a board of arbitration, was
that the formal contract had been abandoned and
one substituted as an implied contract in parol.
The township by statute is denied power to make
any expenditure on a contract not in writing over
$500. The amount involved here was many times
that sum. In view of the lack of power of the
municipality to make a parol contract for a sum
in excess of the set limit, the court held the plaintiff
without a remedy in spite of the fact that the city
had received the benefit of the work.
E. Indebtedness
Neither the contract in the bonds nor the doctrine of estoppel afforded a bondholder a remedy
to seek payment from other funds of the city where
the bonds had been issued payable only from local
improvement funds. State ex rel. Booth v. Tatro,
96 Pac. (2d) 206 (Wash., 1939). The City had
power to issue local improvement district bonds
payable only from the proceeds of special assessments for the local improvements. The bonds carried the recital of the limitation of the fund from
which they were to be payable. The city, without
authority, set up a revolving fund for the payment
of these bonds. A bondholder brought action to
compel payment of his bonds by the city from the
revolving fund. The court held that payment by
the city from the revolving fund was unauthorized
and that since the bondholder had notice of the
limitations on recovery in his bond itself as well
as the statutes, no doctrine of estoppel could be
considered.
F. Moral Obligation
The above cases are good examples of situations
in which a strong appeal could be made to morals
and fairness in spite of the absolute legal invalidity
of the claims advanced. A satisfactory disposition
of such problems requiring, however, appropriate
legislation is suggested in State v. Thiessen, 286
N. W. 561 (Wis. 1939). In this case the city of
Oshkosh had had originally power to construct
water main extensions and to assess the costs
against the abutting owners or to assume the costs
as a public expense. For the first few years the costs
were assessed against abutting owners but later the
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policy was changed and the costs assumed as a public expense. Further legislation was obtained which
permitted refunding to the abutting owners the
amounts which they had paid as water main extension costs. The statute itself stated that the refund
was authorized because of the obvious unfairness
in having assessed the costs against some owners
as improvements while giving others the benefit of
similar improvements without cost. Mandamus was
sought to compel refund of assessments according
to a council resolution pursuant to the statute. It
was held that the legislature had validly authorized
the refund as a recognition of a moral though
legally unenforceable obligation. This is held to
be a public purpose and the state act, although
adopted as a result of the specific situation in
Oshkosh, applies equally to all cities in the state
and is therefore general legislation of uniform
operation.
G. Public Welfare
Appropriation of funds for relief of needy inhabitants is generally recognized as an appropriate
power for delegation by the legislatures to municipalities in spite of the general limitation that public funds cannot be expended for the benefit of
private persons. Relief of paupers, while immediately benefitting the individual recipient, is a discharge of the public duty of the community to
provide for the general welfare. There is even
some slight authority for the proposition that such
power is "inherent" in a municipality without
legislative grant. See McLean Co. v. Humphreys,
104 Ill. 378 (1882).
The recent decision of Board of Sup'rs., Attala
County v. Ill. Central R. Co., 190 So. 241 (Miss.,
1939), recognizes the power of the legislature to
limit to a reasonable extent the amount of taxation
for support of the poor but denies that the legislature could remove the power to tax for this purpose altogether. The state constitution confers on
the local authority the power to provide homes,
etc. for the poor, aged, and unfortunate. This
power is construed as carrying with it the necessary
power to accomplish the purposes authorized. In
this suit involving a petition for refund of taxes
levied for support of paupers which were alleged
to be in excess of the limit prescribed by the legislature, the court held that the legislative limit was
confined to taxes for general purposes and that the
levy for poor relief was for a special purpose not
subject to the general limitation.
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Two other welfare cases discuss the problem of
proof of the settlement of a pauper in one town
and the facts which will show the loss of such a
settlement upon his removal to another. Each case
involved action by one town or the state industrial
commission against another town to recover the
amount of relief furnished persons alleged to have
a settlement in the defendant town and not to
have lost it. In the case of Inhab. of Moscow v.
inhab. of Solon, 7 Atl. (2d) 729 (Me. 1939), the
pauper had established a settlement in town A by
residing there for five years without receiving relief
as a pauper. He left town A for a period of from
three to six weeks with the intention of returning
and did return. It was held that his absence did
not cause him to lose his settlement in town A.
In the case of Town of Cleveland v. Industrial
Commission, 286 N. W. 558 (Wis., 1939), the
Industrial Commission reimbursed the town which
had given relief to a pauper because the pauper
was not settled in that town and the Commission
then sued the town of the pauper's alleged settlement to be reimbursed. The pauper was held not
to have lost his original settlement by his absence
from the town of his admitted first settlement, since
he was not absent during any period as a "party
not a pauper and not needing or receiving support".
JOHN

A.

MCINTIRE

MUNICIPAL UTILITIES
may provide for the acquisition or extension of a municipal utility by pledging
the revenues from the improvement thereby obtained, without being subject to the limitations
upon incurring indebtedness. But if it obligates
itself expressly or by implication to draw upon
the proceeds of taxation to make stipulated payments, it must comply with all requirements for
becoming indebted. A new illustration of this well
recognized rule is furnished in Neff v. City of
Jacksonville, (1939) 190 So. 468. The town of
Green Cove Springs entered into a contract for a
period of ten years with the city of Jacksonville
in Florida, to purchase a supply of electrical current delivered at its generating station for distribution by the town. The town agreed to pay for
such energy unit prices not less than $500 per
month.
The constitution of Florida prohibits a muni-

A
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not unreasonable to provide that they should be
freeholders. The contract in question was not sub- used to retire the investment in it.
Can a local government operating a water sysmitted to the freeholders. It obviously was contemplated that the rates collected by the town for tem, enforce the payment of delinquent water bills
supplying the purchased current to the inhabitants against a transferee acquiring the property to
would provide a fund for the payment of the pur- which the water was furnished, after the incurring
chase price to Jacksonville. But the proceeds of of the charges? The Supreme Court of Utah anthe rates were not pledged. The Supreme Court swered no in Home Owners Loan Corporation v.
of Florida, Division B, said that the contract Logan City, (1939) 92 Pac. (2d) 346, and the
might contingently place a liability for the mini- Supreme Court of Colorado answered yes in Home
mum monthly payments of $500, $60,000 for the Owners Loan Corporation v. Public Water Works
ten years, upon the town, which in turn might District, (1939) 92 Pac. (2d) 745. The difference
require the exercise of the taxing power to satisfy. in the decisions is explained by a difference in the
Consequently the court held that the contract was statutes.
In the Utah case the ordinance of Logan City
a bond within the meaning of the constitutional
provision, and being made without an approving provided that water should not be turned on to
any premises until all charges for water supplied
vote of the freeholders, was illegal.
to the same or a previous owner or occupant had
In Davies v. Village of Madelia, (1939) 287 N.
been paid. The state statute provided that if the
W. 1, a contract between the village of Madelia,
Minnesota, and Fairbanks, Morse & Co. for the owner or occupant of any premises failed to pay
construction of a light, heat and power plant to be for water furnished to such owner or occupant,
the city should not be required to turn the water
owned and operated by the village as a municipal
utility, was under attack in a tax-payers' suit. A on again until all arrears had been paid. The court
a
utility company had been supplying the village held that under this provision of the statute
could
not
be
purchaser
of
premises
subsequent
and its inhabitants with electricity under a contract which was expiring. The controversy was one compelled as a condition of securing water, to pay
the arrears of a prior owner or occupant, unless he
which frequently arises between advocates of muniThe court furcipal ownership and operation of public utilities, had agreed to be liable for them.
said
that
under
the
Utah
statute
Lo lien was
ther
and those who favor keeping such functions as
for
delinquent
water bills
impressed
on
property
private enterprises under public regulation.
nor was a city empowered by ordinance to create
The Supreme Court of Minnesota overruled all such a lien. To the extent that the Logan City
objections to the contract and upheld it. The ordinance purported to do so it was invalid.
objection discussed at greatest length, was that
In the Colorado case, the statute provided that
representatives of Fairbanks, Morse & Company charges for water supplied by water districts should
attended village meetings during the discussion of be a continuing lien upon the property upon which
the project and made suggestions concerning the they are levied, prior to all other liens except genplans and specifications. But the court pointed eral taxes. The court held that under this statute
out that other interests were represented including there was a lien for the price of water supplied, of
the utility company whose franchise was expiring. which all persons dealing with the property were
The court held that there was no collusion but only required to take notice. It further held, that the
open discussion of the matters involved, and that lien was not lost by the water district's failing
the council acted "freely and independently."
to shut off delivery of the water when it became
entitled to do so on account of the delinquency.
of
the
specia
provision
Attack was made upon
fications that any excess in earnings should be used Apparently the Home Owners' Loan Corporation
only for extensions and additions to the plant, and had not known of the charge until after it had
that the earnings from that source should be used perfected title to the property by foreclosure of
only toward payment for the original plant. The its mortgage. Nevertheless it was held liable for
court held in effect that this was a matter fairly the lien.
In Nelson v. Wayne County, (1939) 286 N. W.
within the discretion of the council; that all the
earnings would be made possible by the establish- 617, it appeared that the Board of Auditors of
ment of the original plant, and consequently it was Wayne County, Michigan, had entered into contract
cipality from issuing bonds without a vote of the
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with the Board of Water Commissioners of the City
of Detroit to supply water to the Wayne County
Training School, about five miles from the Detroit
city limits, the mains to connect with the existing
water system of Detroit and necessary reservoir
and machinery to be suppied by the county. The
agreement provided that the city should have the
right to supply water to owners of other properties through the new mains but only with the
written approval of the county. The county expended about $200,000 Zn building the mains, reservoir, and apparatus specified in the contract.
From time to time about twelve permits were
issued for supplying water from the new extension
to private homes in the vicinity. Another application for supply to a residence was made, and investigation showed that the applicant was intending to put on the market a residential subdivision.
The particular addition to the demand upon the
extension would not be substantial, but the extension of it to a subdivision would impair the supply
to the county institution for which the investment of the county had been made. Consequently
the application for approval was rejected by the
county. The Supreme Court of Michigan held
that the rejection was not arbitrary or unreasonable and upheld the dismissal of a mandamus proceeding brought by the applicant against the
county.
City of Coral Gables v. City of Miami, 190 So.
427, presents a situation arising out of the Florida
hurricane in 1935. The city of Coral Gables was
operating at that time a street railway on streets
in the city of Miami under a franchise granted by
Miami in 1925 to a street railway company and
assigned by the company to Coral Gables in 1927.
The storm disrupted the street railway system to
such an extent that some time would be required to
restore it to service, and Coral Gables asked and
was granted by Miami permission to use buses
temporarily during the emergency. The operation
of street cars never was resumed; Coral Gables continued to operate buses instead. In November 1936
Miami passed an ordinance imposing a tax of 5%
upon the gross receipts derived from the transportation of passengers, for the privilege of using
the streets of the city.
Coral Gables sued to enjoin the collection of the
tax on its receipts from the transportation of passengers in buses, on the ground that this would be
a violation of the franchise ordinance. The Supreme Court of Florida, Division A, upheld the
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tax. It said that the franchise ordinance had been
abandoned by the permanent substitution of buses
for street-cars for which the ordinance provided.
The temporary resort to street-cars immediately
after the hurricane had been without prejudice to
the franchise. But more than eighteen months
had intervened between the hurricane and the filing
of the bill to enjoin the tax, during which no steps
had been taken to restore the street railway system.
There was no evidence of any such intention. Under these circumstances the operation of the buses
was not attributable to the franchise ordinance,
and Coral Gables was subject to the tax imposed
by Miami on all vehicles used for the carriage of
persons for hire.
HENRY P. CHANDLER

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND LOCAL
LEGISLATION
IN RECENT months, a number of decisions with
respect to the construction, application and
validity of municipal ordinances and other local
legislation have been rendered. It is the purpose
of this review to digest and discuss several of the
more interesting of these cases, all of which have
been rather arbitrarily classified according to the
subject-matter of the particular ordinance involved.
.The lack of a more pertinent classification is understandable if the broad field encompassed by the
general title of the review be considered.
(a) Freedom of speech and assemblage.
Unquestionably one of the most significant of
the cases to be.treated is Hague et al. v. Committee
for Industrial Organization et al., 59 Sup. Ct.
954 (1939). Although this case has been reviewed previously by Grenville Clark in 5 LEGAL
NOTES 5-8 (July, 1939), it is important for purposes of this review, aside from its civil liberties
implications, for its discussion of the question of
original jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in a
matter involving the validity of a municipal ordinance. The suit was filed by the C.I.O. and others
against the mayor and other officials of Jersey
City to restrain interference with freedom of speech
and assemblage, the bill alleging that pursuant to
an ordinance of Jersey City plaintiffs were denied
the right to hold public meetings and to distribute
pamphlets and other literature.
The ordinance concerning meetings provided in
essence that there should be "no public parades
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or public assemblies in or upon the public streets,
highways, public parks or public buildings of Jersey City" without a permit obtained from the
Director of Public Safety. The Director of Public
Safety was authorized to grant said permit upon
application made three days prior to the proposed
parade or assembly, or to refuse same "for the
purpose of preventing riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage." The ordinance concerning the
distribution of literature forbade any person to
"distribute or cause to be distributed or strewn
about any street or public place any newspapers,
paper, periodical, book, magazine, circular, card
or pamphlet."
In brief, the District Court found that the defendants had adopted a deliberate policy of forbidding plaintiffs and their associates from holding
public meetings or assemblies and from distributing
pamphlets or other literature for the purpose of
communicating their views concerning the National
Labor Relations Act to the citizens of Jersey City.
The court further found that the purposes of the
plaintiffs were lawful, and that their actions had
been peaceful and orderly. The District Court then
concluded that it had jurisdiction of the suit under
Section 24 (1) (12) and (14) of the Judicial Code,
and that defendants' acts were in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Circuit Court of Appeals concurred in the
findings of fact by the District Court and held
that it had jurisdiction under Section 24 (1) and
(14) of the Judicial Code. The decree was affirmed with a modification of one of its provisions.
The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court,
challenging the jurisdiction of the District Court
and the finding that the street-meeting ordinance
was unconstitutional. Defendants also contended
in addition that the decree exceeded the power of
the District Court and was impracticable of enforcement or of compliance.
An opinion in support of the majority holding
was delivered by Mr. Justice Roberts with Mr.
Justice Black concurring.
The first point made in the opinion was that
the District Court did lack jurisdiction of the suit
under Section 24 (1) of the Judicial Code. Section 24 (1) confers original jurisdiction on the
District Courts in civil suits where the amount in
controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and
costs, $3,000, and arises under the constitution or
laws of the United States. In commenting, the
court said: "The record here is bare of any show-

ing of the value of the asserted rights to the respondents individually and the suggestion that, in total,
they have the requisite value is unavailing, since
the plaintiffs may not aggregate their interests in
order to attain the amount necessary to give jurisdiction."
However, the opinion found that the District
Court did have jurisdiction under Section 24 (14)
which grants jurisdiction o! suits "at law or in
equity authorized by law to be brought by any
person to redress the deprivation under color of
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any state of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the constitution of the United
States, or of any right secured by any law of the
United States providing for equal rights of citizens
of the United States, or of all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States." This holding
followed from the determination that "the right
peaceably to assemble and to discuss these topics
[national legislation and matters pertaining there,
to] and to communicate respecting them, whether
orally or in writing, is a privilege inherent in citizens of the United States which the Amendment
protects." The use of the streets and public places
for purposes of peaceful assemblage and speech has
"from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
rights and liberties of citizens"; this privilege may
be regulated for the general comfort and convenience, but it must not "be abridged or denied."
Since the street-meeting ordinance did not make
the general comfort or convenience the standard of
official action, the District Court was correct in
holding it void on its face.
Concerning the objections to the decree, two
modifications were made. First, the decree should
only declare the ordinance prohibiting the distribution of circulars, etc., to be void, and enjoin the
defendants from enforcing it. Second, inasmuch as
the street-meeting ordinance is void, the plaintiffs
are free to hold meetings without a permit; the decree should not specify the conditions under which
a permit must be granted plaintiffs, as this in
effect permits the court to rewrite an invalid ordinance.
In a separate opinion in support of the majority
holding Mr. Justice Stone concurred in the affirmation of the decree as modified, but vigorously dissented with the theory by which this result was
obtained. He argued that freedom of speech and
assemblage are rights secured by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that
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neither of these rights has ever been held to be a
privilege or immunity peculiar to citizens of the
United States to which alone the privileges and
immunities clause refe:s (citing the SlaughterHouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394). The
right to bring a suit to restrain state officers acting under a state law from infringing these rights
is given by Act of Congress (8 U. S. C. A. Section
43) to every person within the United States
whether a citizen or not, and such suit may be
maintained without allegation of proof of the jurisdictional amount required under Section 24 (1)
of the Judicial Code. Mr. Justice Stone was of
the opinion, therefore, that the holding of the
majority of the court involved "constitutional experimentation as gratuitous as it is unwarranted."
However, in spite of the division of the court
in theory, the effect of this case ought to be
a substantial strengthening of the rights of citizens
everywhere to freedom of speech.
(b) Picketing.
As repercussions of the Supreme Court's decision
in the Hague case, we may point to the unanimous
decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan handed
down September 6, 1939, in which an ordinance
seeking to forbid the distribution of handbills
without a license if the handbills contained immoral, libelous or treasonable statement or statements, the truth of which could not be established
to the satisfaction of the city clerk, was held invalid on its face under the ruling of Lovell v. City
of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1938).
The standard set up in the ordinance makes the
city clerk the sole judge of whether or not the
handbill may be distributed and is thus tantamount
to an arbitrary power to refuse permission for such
distribution. City of Dearborn v. Ansell, 287 N.
W. 551 (Mich., Sept. 6, 1939). See also C. W.
Tooke, Individual Jeopardy under Unconsitutional
Ordinances, 3 LEGAL NOTES 351 (May, 1938), 12
So. Cal. L. Rev. 466-468, 14 Ind. L. Journ. 454456.
Another case of considerable interest is People
v. Tilken et al., 90 Pac. (2d) 148 (Cal. App.,
1939) involving four sections of a Los Angeles
ordinance concerning picketing. Section 3 of this
ordinance provided in substance that it "shall be
unlawful for any person to picket" in a manner
calculated or intended to influence another person
to refrain from entering any place of business, from
laboring or seeking employment, from patronizing
such place of business, or from performing various
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other specified acts. Section 4 provided that "the
provisions of Section 3 hereof shall not apply .. .
if all of the conditions hereinafter specified in this
Section exist and if such picketing be conducted
. . in the manner and subject to the limitations,
provisions and regulations hereinafter in this section set forth, to-wit: (a) If a bona fide strike
shall be in progress at a place of business . . .
such place of business may be picketed by such
bona fide employees so designated (as set forth
in this sub-section) . . . " Four other subsections

of Section 4 were prohibitions and restrictions upon
the number of pickets, manner and place of picketing.
Section 5, with phraseology analogous to that of
Section 3, prohibited the carrying and displaying
of banners or other placards. Section 6 provided
that "notwithstanding the provisions of Section 5,
a bona fide employee while carrying on lawful
picketing within the provisions of Section 4 hereof
may wear or carry an arm band or other banner
not exceeding twenty (20) by thirty (30) inches
in size," and setting forth certain permitted representations and statements as specified in the section.
Defendants were convicted on a complaint
charging violation of Sections 3 and 5. On appeal,
this conviction was reversed, the upper court holding that the complaints failed to charge any public
offense "for they failed to charge that any of the
defendants committed an act in violation of any
of the provisions of either Section 4 or 6."
It was the contention of respondents that Sections 4 and 6 were exceptions to Sections 3 and
5 respectively, and that according to the familiar
rule that an indictment, information or complaint
need not allege that an accused does not come
within exceptions mentioned in a statute under
which he was convicted, the conviction was valid.
The court, however, refused to agree with this contention, basing its conclusion that Sections 4 and
6 constitute an integral part of the offense set up
in the ordinance, on the ground that to rule otherwise would render the ordinance unconstitutional
as placing an onerous and weighty burden on the
defendants.
In answer to the argument that the form of the
ordinance was against such a construction, the
court said: "The form of the ordinance, however,
is not conclusive; that which appears to be an exception, set up in a separate section, may prove
to be actually a part of the definition of the offense
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sought to be created. .

.

. While the manner in

which the ordinance is drafted constitutes the
strongest argument against our conclusion, we find
in further details of its drafting support for our
interpretation. That is to say, while the introductory paragraph of Section 4 might well be said
to be cast in the form of an exception, much of
the content of the section is plainly in the language
used in creating crimes."
It is submitted that this construction of the
ordinance by the court is somewhat awkward and
strained, and can only be explained, perhaps, on
the ground that the court was reluctant to declare
the ordinance invalid.
(c) Licenses.
In Hillman v. Sea Isle City, et al., 122 N. J. L.
327, 5 Atl. (2d) 477 (1939), the defendant, a milk
driver, was convicted for the violation of an ordinance requiring a license fee from peddlers. He
was principally engaged in making deliveries of
milk in Sea Isle City to regular customers at their
stores or homes, but also incidentally sold milk at
retail on the streets of the city to casual purchasers.
The chief question was whether defendant's activities constituted peddling within the purview of
the licensing ordinance. In affirming the conviction,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that part
of defendant's activities which was concerned with
the delivery of milk to regular customers at their
homes or places of business was not peddling. In
support of this conclusion, the court cited and discussed Huband v. Evans, 114 N. J. L. 586, 177 At.
871 (1935), and Hewson v. Englewood, 55 N. J. L.
522, 27 Atl. 904 (1893), in both of which cases the
court had held that the activities of the defendant
before it did not constitute peddling. In the instant
case, however, the court determined that part of the
defendant's occupation which consisted in selling
milk and other dairy products from the truck to
customers in the streets of Sea Isle City was
peddling; " . . . one who sells in the streets to

all comers and without ringing the door-bells of
houses is none the less a peddler."
In La Crosse Rendering Work, Inc. v. City of La
Crosse, et al., 285 N. W. 393 (Wis., 1939) a bill
for an injunction was filed by plaintiff, assignee
of a right or license to operate a rendering plant
in La Crosse, which right or license to operate for
50 years had been granted to plaintiff's assignor by
an ordinance passed by the council of the City
of La Crosse. This ordinance was subsequently
repealed, and plaintiff contended that he had ac-

quired vested property rights through investment
in the business in reliance upon said right or license
which could not, therefore, now be interfered with,
and that a general ordinance for licensing of rendering plants is void because the supervision of the
same is under the State Board of Health. A demurrer to the bill was sustained by the lower
court and on appeal the judgment was affirmed.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, quoting from
12 American Jurisprudence, page 57, said: "The
power to legislate in the interest of the morals,
health and safety of the people is not restricted by
the contract clause of the constitution. The exercise of the police power cannot be limited by contract, and it is immaterial on what consideration
the contracts rest, since in all cases it is beyond
the authority of a state or its municipalities to
subrogate this power so necessary to the people's
safety."
In the instant case, therefore, the defendant
city could jnot, and did not, by the enactment of
the first ordinance, divest itself of its right thereafter in the exercise of its police power, to repeal
said ordinance and enact the general licensing ordinance. The original ordinance operated merely as
a license and could be revoked for cause, or repealed by the city through the exercise of its
police power. In saying that there was no conflict
between the statutes of the State and the provisions
of the general licensing ordinances so as to render
the latter invalid, the court quoted from Fox v.
Racine, 225 Wis. 542, 545 (1937): "The mere fact
that the state in the exercise of the police power has
made certain regulations does not . . . prohibit a
municipality from enacting additional requirements. So long as there is no conflict between the
two, and the requirements of the municipal by-law
are not in themselves pernicious, as being unreasonable or discriminatory, both will stand . . . "
The court further overruled objections raised by
complainant to the lack of sufficient standards set
up in the ordinance, and decided that the ordinance
contained sufficiently definite standards with respect to the granting or refusing of licenses by the
eouncil.
In Pearson v. City of Seattle, et al., 90 Pac.
(2d) 1020 (Wash., 1939), plaintiff sued to recover
license fees alleged to have been illegally exacted
under an ordinance imposing a $25.00 license tax
on each solid fuel dealer, plus $15.00 for each fuel
truck used in excess of one. In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, the court held that where
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.an ordinance is solely a regulatory measure, "the
classification may not be such as to unjustly discriminate against persons or against a particular
business by omitting from the regulations persons
or lines of business operating in the same class;"
however, "a business may be classified by ordinance
under the police power of a state if the object of
the legislation is revenue, and all necessary and
proper penalties may be provided to insure its due
enforcement." The court proceeded to point out
"a vital distinction . . . between the power to tax
occupations under the form of a license which by
reason of the character of the occupation is subject
to police regulation, and the power to tax what
are termed useful trades and employments under
the guise of a license. It is well settled that the
license required of employments of the latter character can carry with it only such fee as is necessary to make compensation for the regulation services, and cannot be perverted into a tax." (This
quotation reiterated by the court was from Seattle
v. Dencker, 58 Wash. 501, 108 Pac. 1086 (1910).
The court then concluded that the ordinance in
question (expressly declaring on its face that it
should be termed and construed as a police measure
and not a revenue measure) was discriminatory in
singling out a particular business and seeking to
impose upon it special regulations. "The city may
not . . . impose a revenue tax under the guise of
a police regulation."
In Commonwealth v. Saitz, 6 Atl. (2d) 819
(Pa., 1939), there was presented to the court the
question of liability for mercantile license tax of
the defendant, proprietor of a cigar store, where a
leased "pinball" machine had been installed. The
statute provided that a tax be imposed on a person
keeping for profit "any alley or place in which
any game is played with the use of balls and pins
or other objects." The court held that the machine
in question which deflected the balls by photoelectric "eyes" instead of by pins or pegs was
included within the wording of the statute, and
that the defendant was liable for the license tax.
The case concerned strictly a point of construction,
and the court apparently adopted a very liberal and
broad interpretation. This may be partially explained on the basis of a previous decision, Commonwealth v. Klucher, 326 Pa. 587, 193 Atl. 28
(1937), in which the court had decided that the
proprietor of a store maintaining a "pin ball game"
was required to obtain a license and pay the fee prescribed by the statute. The instant case, therefore,
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merely necessitated an extension of the classification of "pinball" machines.
BARNET HODES

Assisted by

(a)

HERBERT

M.

ABRAMS

SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS
The distinction between local and general
improvements

A number of significant decisions regarding special assessments have been rendered in recent
months. What may well prove to be a leading
case on the difference between local and general
improvements is City of St. Louis v. Pope, 126
S. W. (2d) 1202 (Mo., 1939). In this case the
Supreme Court of Missouri held that a special
assessment could not be levied by the city of St.
Louis to defray any part of the cost of acquiring
land for a public plaza near the City Hall, to
be known as Memorial Plaza, on which it was contemplated there should be erected a memorial
building or monument in appreciation of the services of the citizen soldiers of Missouri in the
World War, "and for the purpose of preserving
the records and perpetuating the memory of their
heroic achievements and sacrifices."
The charter of St. Louis contains a provision
that special assessments may be levied upon property specially benefited to provide funds for the
payment of damages for lands condemned for various specified purposes including "public squares
and parks" and another provision that damages for
lands condemned for other public purposes shall
be paid by -the city. In considering whether the
proposed Memorial Plaza was a "public square"
or a "park" within the meaning of the quoted
charter provision, the court made an exhaustive
study of the meaning of the word "plaza," and
particularly the sense given to it in Spanish because
it is of Spanish origin. The court concluded that
it meant more than an open space for air or grass,
trees, and recreation, signifying rather "a pretentious open space of considerable importance, activity and grandeur faced by the most important
public and commercial edifices,-the center of civic
activities." The Memorial Plaza in St. Louis was
of this character, being adjacent to the City Hall
and designed as a civic center. This the court
held was unique, different from an ordinary public
square or park for which a special assessment
under the charter might be levied. Correspond-
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ingly the improvement was general and not local.
The cout said, "A memorial is never erected for
the purpose of conferring special benefits on adjacent property."
Incidental to the main issue was a question of
evidence. The trial court admitted in evidence a
pamphlet signed by numerous organizations and
a citizens' committee appointed by the mayor, and
widely circulated among the voters during the
campaign for bond issues to defray the city's share
of the cost of a system of improvements, of which
the Memorial Plaza was one. This pamphlet contained arguments for the improvements and showed
general public interest in them. The trial court
overruled an objection that the pamphlet was not
issued by the city and could not bind it. The
Supreme Court approved the ruling saying that the
history of the improvement shown by the pamphlet
was a proper matter for the court to consider.
On a somewhat similar question, the Supreme
Court of Illinois more than twenty years ago in
City of Chicago v. Lord, 277 Ill. 397 (1917) took
a somewhat different position. In a proceeding for
a special assessment to defray the cost of widening Twelfth Street (now Roosevelt Road) in that
city, it was shown that the improvement was part
of the Chicago Plan evolved by a citizens' commission appointed by the city to develop a general
plan of public improvements. The court in that
case said, "The commission was not a corporate
authority of the city." The Illinois court held that
the greatest advantage of the street widening would
accrue to the locality of the street, and did not
attach much weight to the inclusion of the improvement in the Chicago Plan. The widening of
a street, even an important street, has plainly
much more of the elements of a local improvement than a civic center so that the Illinois case
was different. The result there is not questioned.
Notwithstanding that, the greater consideration
given to the 'motive for the improvement and the
nature of the support for it, in the recent Missouri
decision evinces a somewhat more open-minded
attitude on the part of the court.
In City of Newark v. Essex County Circuit
Court, 6 Atl. (2d) 671 (N. J. Sup., 1939), the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the establishment of a plaza in Newark in accordance with
an agreement with a railroad company, was a
railroad improvement, and hence not local and
would not support a special assessment. This case

and more particularly the Missouri case, indicate a
salutary disposition of the courts to protect property owners against special assessments for improvements which are really general and ought to
be paid for by the entire people. In addition the
Missouri decision is an excellent example of the
study of sources in arriving at the interpretation of
a word. It has unusual interest and literary merit.
(b)

The limitation of special assessments to a
proportion of value

It has been urged in many quarters that a safeguard against the abuse of special assessments
would be to limit assessments to some specified proportion of the value of the property. In City of
Morehead v. Nickell, 128 S. W. (2d) 723 (Ky.,
1939), the Supreme Court of Kentucky enforced
a limit of 50%. The city brought suit to compel
the payment of two assessments, on specified property. On a plea that the assessments exceeded
50% of the value of the property, the matter was
submitted to a jury which found that the value
was less than double the amount of the larger
assessment. In consequence the trial court reduced
that assessment to one-half of the value determined by the jury, and let the other stand. The
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. It held
that the property owners were not estopped to
raise the objection that the assessment exceeded
half the value of the property by paying the first
two of the ten annual installments, and that those
installments should be credited upon the assessment as reduced to conform with the value.
As above stated there will probably be general
approval for the policy of limiting special assessments to a fixed proportion of the value of the
property assessed. In order to be effective such a
limit will have to apply to the total of all assessments instead of any single assessment as apparently was the rule in the Kentucky case. On the
other hand it would seem that the statute establishing the limit should require any objection that
the limit is exceeded, to be raised within a reasonable period after the levy of the assessment, instead
of permitting it to be brought up two years later
after payments on account of the assessment have
been made as was done in the Kentucky case. The
decision in that case was based on the failure
of the statute to place any limit upon the time
of raising the objection.
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(c)

Abutting property for the purpose of an assessment

City of Winston Salem v. Smith, 3 S. E. (2d)
328 (N. C., 1939), decided by the Supreme Court
of North Carolina, was a proceeding to enforce
special assessments for paving and sidewalk. The
resolution of the city provided that part of the
cost should be defrayed by special assessment on
the abutting property. The pavement and sidewalk laid were narrower than the land which the
city had acquired for a street adjacent to the property assessed, so that there was an unimproved
strip between the sidewalk and the private property, although the title to it was in the city. The
court held that in consequence the land assessed
did not abut the improvement and was not subject
to assessment. The purported assessment was void
and the objection could be raised in defence against
the action to enforce notwithstanding failure to
object at the time of the levy of the assessment.
The result of the decision under the terms of the
resolution for the improvement, may have been
necessary. It illustrates, however, that the right
to levy a special assessment for a local improvement should be made to turn by the applicable
legislative act, upon the question whether the
property assessed is specially benefited, rather
than as in this case the more or less arbitrary test,
whether it abuts the improvement.
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perior to all other liens" against the lands assessed.
The relation between tax liens and liens of special
assessments depends of course upon the provisions
of the statutes of the particular state. But the rule
which accords parity to special assessment liens
instead of subordinating them to the lien of general taxes, is equitable, and may be expected to be
recognized increasingly in the public policy of the
various states.
(e)

Liability to new assessment for completed
improvement where first assessment held
illegal.

It not infrequently happens that an improvement is held illegal on objection to an assessment,
but that by the time the matter of the assessment
is finally determined, particularly in case of appeal, the improvement has been constructed. It is
a sound rule of public policy requiring however an
express statute, that if the objecting owner is
specially benefited by the improvement and there
is nothing in it contra bonos mores, he should be
compelled to pay his fair share of the cost under
a second assessment notwithstanding that the first
assessment was held illegal. Statutes providing
for this will ordinarily be given a liberal construction in favor of the right of assessment in order
to prevent the manifest injustice of a property
owner's receiving for nothing the benefit of a local
improvement for which his neighbors similarly
(d) The relation between special assessment situated are 'compelled to pay.
liens and tax liens
Such a case is Winnetka Park District v. HopFor some time it has been a mooted question in kins, 371 Ill. 46, 20 N. E. (2d) 58 (1939). Land
Illinois whether the lien of special assessments is had been condemned for a 'local park, and the
on a parity with the lien of general taxes or owner of adjacent land had been assessed for a
whether the latter is paramount. The question has part of the cost. The assessment had been set
been laid at rest by the decision of the Illinois aside by a court on account of defects in the proSupreme Court in People v. Taylorville Sanitary ceeding. In the reported case the Supreme Court
of Illinois upheld a new assessment based upon
District, 371 Il1. 280, 20 N. E. (2d) 576 (1939).
The court upon examination of the provisions of the benefit from the completed improvement, notthe Local Improvement Act governing special as- withstanding that there was an unexplained delay
sessments and the Revenue Act governing the levy of nearly fifteen years between the filing of the
assessment and collection of taxes, deduced a legis- second assessment in court and the confirmation
lative intent that the liens of general taxes and of it by the court. The property-owner objected
special assessments should be "on a parity and that the provisions of the statute for a new assessequal, with no preference or priority of any one ment, referred to improvements consisting of conover the other". Recently also in Paulk v. City of struction work and did not refer to improvements
Ocilla, 2 S.E. (2d) 642 (1939), the Supreme Court consisting of the acquisition of land. The court
of Georgia gave effect to the statute of that state interpreted the statute broadly, however, and this
is in accordance both with the terms of the act
making the lien of special assessments "coequal
with the liens of other taxes, and prior to and su- quoted in the decision, and the equitable principle
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it discriminated between the holders of judgments
of federal courts and the holders of judgments of
state courts. The court overruled the argument
Immunity of property assessed from an addi- that the judgment of the federal court was an
(f)
tional assessment to compensate for adjudication which compelled the levy of the reassessments on other property held il- assessment, saying that the judgment was a deterlegal.
mination of the amount due to the bondholders on
specially
their bonds, but that it did not bind the propertyIt is a converse of the rule that property
reassessed
owners reassessed because they were not parties
be
may
benefited by a local improvement
imto the suit in the federal court. "In so far as it
completed
the
from
received
benefit
the
for
(the judgment) attempted to increase the burden
provement, even though the assessment levied in
on their property by authorizing an additional
anticipation of the improvement was held illegal,
that property which has had its full share of an assessment under an unconstitutional law and thus
prejudice their rights, it is a nullity."
assessment cannot be subjected to an additional
The case presents an interesting conflict of interother
on
assessments
for
up
make
to
assessment
est between the holders of bonds against an assessproperty held illegal. Such a case is Barrett v.
ment part of which is held illegal, and the propertyBoard of Commissioners of Tulsa County, 90 Pac.
owners rightfully assessed who have paid their
(2d) 442, decided by the Supreme Court of Oklaassessments. It would seem good public policy to
drainage
a
by
levied
homa. Part of an assessment
secure the payment of the bonds which were purlevied
was
it
because
collected
be
not
could
district
chased in good faith, in reliance on the availability
on the lands of Indians not subject to assessment.
of assessments to pay them. On the other hand
In a suit brought by bondholders in the federal
there is much equity on the side of the propertycourt in Oklahoma on account of the resulting deagainst a new imposition in no way atowners
federal
the
fault in payment of some of the bonds,
to their fault* The fairest solution of
tributable
County
Tulsa
against
judgment
court had awarded
where the law permits it, is probproblem
a
such
should
it
that
specifying
arrears,
in
for the amount
ably to place the burden upon the tax-payers
not be a general judgment but that it should be
generally. Of course the entire difficulty can be
paid by reassessment against the lands of the drainavoided by determining accurately in the first inthat
age district. A statute of Oklahoma provided
stance what property is legally subject to assesswere
district
improvement
in
an
when any lands
not assessable, the total assessment might be pro- ment, and apportioning the assessment only on
such property.
rated among the lands subject to assessment.

against discrimination among
which would otherwise result.

property-owners

Even so the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held
in the cited case, at the instance of owners of
property reassessed, that the reassessment was illegal and could not be enforced. The primary
ground was the injustice of imposing on propertyowners who had already paid their assessment, a
deficit due to the illegality of other assessments.
The court said that the statute referred to, permitted the cost of an improvement to be assessed in
the first instance upon lands subject to assessment
disregarding lands exempt, but that it did not
authorize the levy of a second assessment after
the first had been completed and might fairly be
regarded as closed.
Another statute of Oklahoma provided that
when a judgment was rendered in a federal court
based on bonds of a drainage district, an assessment should be made sufficient to pay it. The
Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that this statute
was unconstitutional as special legislation because

The effect of the Statute of Limitations upon
the enforcement of special assessment securities
A city issuing special assessment securities, has
many of the characteristics of a trustee in reference
to the enforcement of the securities for the benefit
of the holders, even though it is not liable for them
out of its general funds. It must use due diligence
to 'collect the assessment, and it must hold and
apply the proceeds only for payment of the obligations issued against them. It would be quite
logical that as a trustee it should be held not entitled to the defense of the Statute of Limitations.
The rule is generally, however, that the Statute
of Limitations applies, and actions by contractors
or holders of special assessment obligations are
barred unless brought within the period fixed by
law for actions of a similar nature. In City of El
Paso v. West, 102 Fed. (2d) 927, the Federal
(g)
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Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, edge of the making of the improvement, and held
applied a two year statute of limitations to that after the eleven years which had elapsed, it
suits by holders of special assessment certificates was too late for her to complain of defects in the
to hold the city of El Paso liable for the loss re- procedure.
sulting from negligence in failing to collect special
HENRY P. CHANDLER
assessments. The court in its opinion stated that
the suits were in the nature of actions in tort for
money damages and so treated by the parties.
THE REGULATION OF STREETS AND
There are two rather obvious points to be drawn
HIGHWAYS
from this case.
First, the holders of special assessment securi- W HEN the control of local streets is taken by
the state or a state agency for a through
ties and their counsel should pay attention to the
Statute of Limitations in order to avoid any danger highway or boulevard, questions frequently arise
concerning the right of regulation for various purof being barred by it.
poses.
Such a question was decided by the Supreme
Second, if the defence of the statute is raised,
Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in City of Medand the statute seems to have run, the only prospect of avoiding it lies in emphasizing the fiduciary ford v. Metropolitan District Commission, (1939)
duties of a city in reference to its special assess- 22 N. E. (2d) 110. This concerned the Fellsway
ment securities. In the reported decision the court part of the Metropolitan Park System radiating
said that neither case "appeals to equity to treat from Boston under the control of the Metropolitan
the City as the trustee of a fund and to hold it to District Commission. The Commission was cutan account of what it has or ought to have in ting down shade trees along the boulevard within
hand." Perhaps such an appeal if made .would not the cities of Medford and Malden. The cities conhave succeeded in those particular cases. But the tended that the care of the trees was their functrust theory is sound and much the most promis- tion. There was no statute that expressly provided
ing defence against the Statute of Limitations for the care of trees on boulevards, but under the
general provision committing to the Metropolitan
where the period of the statute has run.
District Commission the preservation and care of
(h) Propriety of the appointment of a receiver boulevards, the court held that the control of the
to represent the holders of special assess- trees on the boulevard was in the Commission and
ment securities
not in the cities.
A dley Express Company v. Town of Darien,
Harvey v. City of St. Petersburg, 189 So. 861,
(1939) 7 Atl. (2d) 446, involved a complaint by
was a proceeding brought to foreclose certificates
of indebtedness issued against property assessed an express company against the exclusion of its
for the construction of sidewalks. The statute of trucks from Noroton Avenue in the Town of
Darien, Connecticut, which formed part of the
Florida provided that the lien of such certificates
route of the Boston Post Road, a heavily travelled
of
name
the
in
or
city,
the
by
enforced
might be
the city by the holders. In the cited case the pro- automobile highway. The Supreme Court of Errors
ceeding was brought by a receiver who had previ- of Connecticut held that if the town had authority
ously been appointed by a court to take charge to pass the ordinance excluding trucks from the
of all the certificates of the particular issue and street in question, the court would uphold the ordisecure their collection. The principal issues in the nance even though it put trucks to the inconvenicase were whether the appointment of a receiver for ence of a considerable detour because the evidence
such securities was proper and whether he could showed that the presence of trucks in Noroton
maintain the foreclosure. The Supreme Court of Avenue was an element of danger. The court held
Florida upheld the authority of the receiver, ob- however that a regulation of the nature of the
serving that "the interest of the different holders regulation involved was within the province of the
became so confused that it was not feasible or state and not of the town under the statutes. It
practicable to bring separate suits to enforce their therefore enjoined the enforcement of the ordirights." The property-owner in her answer alleged nance.
A method of regulating parking that has been
that the sidewalks had been laid without notice to
her, but the court found that she had actual knowl- rather widely discussed and given a much more
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limited application is the designation of parking
areas in which there shall be a small charge for
parking collected through the medium of parking
meters. The case of County Court of Webster
County v. Roman, (1939) 3 S. E. (2d) 631, deals
with such a method in the Town of Addison, West
Virginia. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia upheld the legality of a town ordinance
prohibiting the parking of automobiles in designated areas in the streets except upon the payment
of a five cent charge to be deposited in parking
meters. One judge dissented and another who concurred in the result, expressed the view that the
opinion of the majority was too broad, and that
the installation of parking meters would be reasonable only in areas of heavy traffic. The majority
of the court held that the power vested in the town
to regulate the parking of vehicles in streets, authorized it to establish a reasonable charge for
parking to be collected by parking meters if in its

discretion it saw fit. Some of the objectors were
owners of adjoining property, and they contended
that an incident of their ownership was the right
to park their vehicles in the adjacent street without
charge. The Supreme Court of Alabama so held in
1937 in City of Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson
Realty Company, 172 So. 114, 108 A. L. R. 1140.
The Supreme Court of West Virginia rejected this
conclusion however, saying that although an abutter had a right of ingress and egress over the street
to and from his property, he had no right within
the area of the street superior to that of the general
public. Inasmuch as the court adjudged a system
of parking meters to be a reasonable method within
the discretion of the public authorities, of regulating parking in the streets, it was legal in relation to abutting owners as well as the public
generally.
HENRY P.

CHANDLER
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